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The succession formed by 19th century theories of light displays conceptual discontinuities, but realists deny that these are either as widespread or as radical as Laudan and his followers have suggested. In particular, Philip Kitcher, Jarrett Leplin and Stathis Psillos [KL&P], point out that successful theories are not something one should take or reject as monolithic wholes: a false theory can still be approximately true in significant ways. According to these realists, modern science has delivered a fairly stable and well-supported network of theoretical assertions and posits which is our best account of what the world is like. Leplin voices this claim well: 
"[W]here past theories have met the standards imposed for warranting theoretical belief, their eventual failure is not a total failure; those of their theoretical mechanisms implicated in achieving that warrant are recoverable from current theory (Leplin 1997, p 145). 

In their analyses of Fresnel's theories of diffraction, KL&P variously conclude that the theories at hand did not invoke the ether essentially at points relevant to Fresnel’s derivation of diffraction patterns. Fresnel, they claim, didn’t actually need the ether in order to derive the experimental tests that made each of his theories a success story. Unfortunately, this line of response has not managed to convince many critics of realism. 
What exactly, in Fresnel’s derivation of diffraction patterns, made his use of the ether concept “inessential” or “idle”? Psillos (1999) offers an initially promising criterion: 

Suppose that a hypothesis H together with another set of hypotheses BH’ (and some auxiliaries A) entail a prediction P. Then H indispensably contributes to the generation of P if BH’ and A alone cannot yield P and no other available hypothesis H* which is consistent with BH’ and A can replace H without loss in the relevant derivation of P.

The above criterion has not been well received by critics, who have variously and convincingly pointed out that in the ether case as well as numerous other cases the scientists involved were too strongly guided by what KL&P call unnecessary or inessential components of the theory. Crucially, the criterion counts on synchronic tracking being discerning enough to single out theoretical constituents that get right some deep aspect of the domain at hand, but the arguments and case studies KL&P have provided for this seem flawed. Critics of all denominations have raised complaints, including many with realist leanings. Thus, for example, Chang (2003) rejects KL&P analyses of the case of caloric theory, arguing that many features of caloric that were rejected by subsequent physics were central to the success of caloric theory; Carrier (2004) further questions the idea that the theoretical terms of successful science typically refer to real objects, arguing that the history of science rules out realist position except about natural kinds. Chakravartty (2003, 2007) reacts to the problems of full realism about selected theory-parts by advocating an intermediate position between realism and non-realism according to which we learn about structures and entities in the world (their dispositions capabilities and contexts) by sorting out the kinds of relations between things that structural realists emphasize. Lyons (2006) stresses that “Credit will have to be attributed to all responsible constituents, including mere heuristics (such as mystical beliefs), weak analogies, mistaken calculations, logically invalid reasoning, etc.” I broadly agree with these “quasi-realist” critics. Scientific theories are tight constructs, and breaking them into parts is generally not doable while they are just beginning to fly. The attractive partitions proposed by KL&P seem possible only with the benefit of hindsight. 
Does this kill the strategy of carving up theories into parts? In the following sections I look deeper into the ether case, hoping to suggest a version of the strategy that survives the objections that stand in the way of the current KL&P project.

2. FRESNEL ON THE ETHER 
Confidence in the wave theory grew with its success in terms of novel predictions and surprising convergences and connections. Subsequent work with the theory led Fresnel to show convergences of theoretical results drawn from different starting points, which reassured Fresnel about the ether posit. Alternative derivations of the predictions were subsequently explored by Fresnel himself. In his first memoir on Double Refraction (1821) Fresnel even deploys an “alternative,” geometrical approach that doesn’t explicitly resort to the ether posit and arrives at an equation ‘of the right sort’. Having done this, however, Fresnel thinks it crucial to devise an ether-based dynamical scheme to suit it and goes on until he reaches the same wave front to which he had been originally led by purely geometrical considerations. As far as Fresnel’s understanding of his theory’s success is concerned, his geometrical conjecture could now be regarded as substantiated by a study of the dynamics of the medium (Whittaker 1953). At the end of the memoir, Fresnel says: 

“The theory which I have adopted, and the simple constructions which I have deduced from it, have this remarkable character, that all the unknown quantities are determined together by the solution of the problem. We find at the same time the velocities of the ordinary ray and of the extraordinary ray, and their planes of polarization. Physicists who have studied attentively the laws of nature will feel that such simplicity and such close relation between the different elements of the phenomenon are conclusive in favor of the hypothesis on which they are based.” 

Important epistemological seeds seem discernible here. In the 1830s and 1840s, William Whewell, who followed with great interest the rise of the wave theory of light, would give emblematic expression to many of the epistemological ideas associated with the empirical success of Fresnel theory. Whewell’s work on initially unexpected convergences drew at least in part from the sense of epistemological worth voiced in the above quote. He was also a staunch optimist about the growth of theoretical knowledge. In The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Part II, Whewell credits past theories for specific (partial) discoveries, and he goes as far as presenting “undesigned scope” as a criterion of reality, stressing that theories that contributed undesigned success “have never ever been subsequently abandoned in “all respects” [Whewell, (1847), Part II, Book XI]. Fresnel’s theory had been good in all these regards. Confidence in the ether gained strength from this kind of scientific epistemology. 
It will not do to point to the bizarre character of the postulated ether. Leading light theorists did not single out the ether as a seriously weak posit until late in the 19th century. Prior to that time they didn’t consider the ether too “speculative” or “unsupportive;” its weird physical characteristics and peculiarities were appreciated as such, but theorists responded to them by appealing to analogies that seemed relevant at the time (for example, with some viscous liquids, also with precursor notions of resonant transmission for high frequencies).

3. REFINING THE CONCEPT
By 1860 alternative (Lagrangian) derivations of Fresnel’s equations were available. And yet, manifestly, top scientists of the period considered the ether “essential.” But scientific commitment to the ether didn’t really change as the century progressed​[1]​ As Maxwell famously put it, 

“Whatever difficulties we may have in forming a consistent idea of the constitution of the ether, there can be no doubt that the interplanetary and interstellar spaces are not empty, but are occupied by a material substance or body, which is certainly the largest, and probably the most uniform body of which we have any knowledge.” [Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th edition (1893), VIII, p. 572. This article first appeared in 1878] 

On their part, influential textbooks of the time exude scientific confidence on the existence of the ether, while admitting that the dynamical theory of the ether remains incomplete.
	
“A motion of a particular kind communicated to the ether can give rise to the phenomenon of heat; a motion of the same kind, but of greater frequency, produces light; and it may be that a motion different in form or in character is the cause of electricity. ” {Adolphe Ganot: Elements de Physique, translated and edited by E. Atkinson as Elementary Treatise on Physics, Experimental and Applied (1860 and after)}

“[The question is not whether there is an ether but rather] how is the ether affected by the gross matter which it invests and permeates? Does it move when they move? If not, does the relative motion between the ether and other matter change the length of the undulation or the time of oscillation?” {Joseph Lovering (c. 1875)}

“You can imagine particles of something, the thing whose motion constitutes light. This thing we call the luminiferous ether. That is the only substance we are confident of in dynamics. One thing we are sure of, and that is the reality and substantiality of the luminiferous ether.” {William Thomson (later Lord Kelvin), ‘The Wave Theory of Light’; 1884}

“There can no longer be any doubt that light waves consist of electric vibrations in the all-pervading ether, and that the latter possesses the properties of an insulator and a magnetic medium.” {H. Helmholtz: Preface to Heinrich Hertz, The Principles of Mechanics Presented in a New Form, 1899}

No less telling about confidence in the existence of the ether are the wealth of end-of-century reports on the “state of physics” by respected commentators around 1900 who go out of their way to claim that physics could do without the ether. Negative results like those of the M&M (1886) experiment did not diminish confidence in the existence of the ether, let alone the perceived intellectual need for it. To T. C. Mendenhall , for example, the demand for a medium to carry light waves was satisfied by “what is known as the ethereal medium, at a first purely imaginary substance, but whose real existence is practically established.” { T.C, Mendenhall, Smithsonian Institution (1900) }*

“[Regarding the ether] its discovery may well be looked upon the most important feat of our century.” {Henry. S. Williams, Nineteenth-Century Science (1900)}*

“Among the concepts which have come to stay in scientific thinking, that of the ether must now be included. … It is as real as the concept of ‘atom’ or ‘molecule’ but hardly more so.” {J. Arthur Thomson, Progress of Science in the Century; London: W. & R. Chambers (1902/1906)} *

“[It is] a fact deduced by reasoning from experiment and observation” … There is abundant proof that it is not merely a convenient scientific fiction, but is as much an actuality as ordinary gross, tangible, and ponderable substances. It is, so to speak, matter of a higher order, and occupies a rank in the hierarchy of created things which places it above the materials we can see and touch.” { J. A. Fleming, Waves and Ripples in Water, Air and Aether (1902)}*

“[I am] practically certain that there must be a medium whose proper function is to transmit light waves.” {A. A. Michelson: Light Waves and Their Uses; Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1903)} 
	
The ether lingered on. As late as 1919 we find Oliver Lodge urging that “the aether is needed for any clear conception of potential energy, for any explanation of elasticity, for any physical idea of the forces which unite and hold together the discrete particles of matter, whether by gravitation or cohesion or electric or magnetic attraction, as well as for any reasonable understanding of what is meant by the velocity of light.” {“Aether and Matter: being remarks on Inertia, and on Radiation, and on the Possible Structure of Atoms,” Nature (Vol 104, Sep 4, 1919) } Lodge is even more dramatic in a speech delivered in Edinburgh in 1921: 

“… an intelligent deep-sea fish would disbelieve in water…. Such is our own condition in regard to the aether of space.” [“Speech through the Aether,” Nature (108, Sept 15, 1921): 88]. Later in the paper he adds “Let us grant, then, that the ether impinges on us only though our imagination; that does not mean that it is unreal. To me, it is the most real thing in the material universe.” (p. 89, my italics)

A disclaimer becomes important at this point. None of the above quotes “proves” that the ether was a “necessary” posit. The quotes simply document the commitment that physicists high in the hierarchy had for the ether posit. 
	 Why were they so attached to the ether? The quoted expressions, together with the detailed deployment of the ether posit in theoretical analyses and deductions, jointly suggest that more than empirical success and theoretical success were involved in the persistence of the ether hypothesis. 
	
4. AN ENTRENCHED CONCEPTION
Salient in the above assurances is an entrenched view of understanding according to which to understand a physical system meant to understand it mechanically. Consider William Thomson’s statement : 

“I can never satisfy myself until I can make a mechanical model of a thing. If I can make a mechanical model I can understand it. As long as I cannot make a mechanical model all the way through I cannot understand, and that is why I cannot get the electro-magnetic theory. I firmly believe in an electro-magnetic theory of light, and that when we understand electricity and magnetism and light, we shall see them together as parts of a whole. But I want to understand light as well as I can without introducing things that we understand even less. That is why I take plain dynamics.” {Notes of Lectures on Molecular Dynamics and The Wave Theory of Light”}

Equally relevant is background inductive knowledge regarding waves: The prototypes for wave-talk were water waves and sound waves. Both “clearly” require a medium. Ever since waves entered the gaze of natural philosophers, the concept of “being a wave” had been understood as “being a propagating perturbation.” Some thick “received metaphysics” seems to be at work here.
This way of thinking had been firmly in place for a long time. Some two-hundred years earlier, its expressions covered a considerable range of features: 

“The extension of a body in length, breath and depth justifies the conclusion that it is a substance, since it is wholly contradictory that there should be extension that is the extension of nothing”… and…“since there is extension there, there must necessarily be substance there as well.” [Descartes, Principles II ]

As we have seen, until the 1910s waves remained to be regarded as a “modes of being”—i.e. completely dependent for their being on something else existing simultaneously. Like shadows and the smile of the Cheshire Cat, a wave ranked lowest in the ontology chart. It simply could not be without dome material substratum that was perturbed. In Fresnel’s theory (and in Maxwell’s) the theoretical derivations that “succeeded” had conceptual links that were not up for grabs. Physics was embedded in a scientific framework that was itself embedded in a metaphysical framework that made the ether “necessary.” And 19th century physicists were not 20th century scientists. In particular they were not prepared, let alone willing, to question necessitarian thought nearly as radically as their successor would beginning a few decades later. 
With the previous suggestions in mind let us return to the ether case. Separating the ideas of wave and medium needed a level of conceptual atomization that would be encouraged only several decades after Fresnel, partly by the rise of empiricism-positivist interpretations of science, and partly by various null-result experiments like those by Michelson and Morley. Full separation of the ideas of ‘wave’ and ‘requiring a physical medium’ would be at the heart of Einstein’s revolutionary move at the dawn of the 20th century, and of much of the rage that it initially arose in the scientific establishment. 
So, contrary to KL&P, the optical ether was “essential” not just to Fresnel’s theories, also to subsequent wave theories in the century. Denying synchronic centrality to the ether is just an artifact of retrospective reference. In the 19th century the ether hypothesis could not have been properly “replaced” by an independently motivated, non ad hoc, potentially explanatory alternative. Even though alternative hypotheses were arguably available (notably in terms of the Lagrangian formulations), the point is that, to the mind of the scientists involved, being a wave implied having a medium.
At first sight, the case presented works badly not just for for KL&P’s specific program but for the project of scientific realism. My final argument is that contrary to appearances, the ether case actually points to a more promising way of singling out good theory parts.. It seizes on the diachronic character of conceptual partition, retention and warrant as displayed by the case at hand. 

5. EXCISING THE ETHER TOOK TIME
Maxwell had sought to connect his theory with mechanical ideas about the light ether. In 1884 Hertz rederived Maxwell's equations by a new method, casting them in “modern form.” His formulation bypassed explicit assumptions regarding the ether. Hertz “cleaned up” the theory, saving those parts of the theory that one could not leave behind without incurring in serious empirical loss. Under Hertz’s influence physicists gradually came to regard electric and magnetic field strengths as fundamental concepts that did not require mechanical explanation. Maxwell’s theory began to be regarded as what he had articulated “Maxwell’s equations.” As already explained, however, top physicists kept the old foundational framework in place. An interesting player in this regard is Lorentz, who entirely separated ether and ordinary matter while still regarding the ether as completely penetrating matter, even if it did not transmit mechanical forces and was everywhere at rest. 
But if the ether was not dragged then the Earth should have an absolute velocity with respect to it. But the effects of the ether wind were not observed and so it was essential for Lorentz to explain why. He accounted for the null-result of the M&M experiment by introducing the idea of length-contraction in terms of the effect of motion through the ether on intermolecular forces. Although Lorentz expected that mechanics would be replaced by electrodynamics as the basis of physics he never abandoned his belief in the ether as a unique privileged frame of reference at rest in which Maxwell’s equations obtained. He simply deprived it of its mechanical properties but immobility. 
Simultaneously, a radically different take on the fundamental questions at hand began to be taken by Einstein, who leaned towards a more stance on the ether issue. Einstein’s rational motivations have been traced to many sources. One is his studies of philosophy (particularly the work of Kant and then the work of such empiricist interpreters as J.S. Mill, Karl Pearson, Richard Avenarius, and Ernest Mach). Another is the epistemological stance on prediction as encouraged at Zurich Polytechnic. There were also the growing number of the empirical null-results from experimental physics regarding the ether. The list goes on. It also includes assessments of the technology of clock synchronization at the Patent Office, and public discussion of the diplomacy of time-zones (Galison 2004) 
To Einstein, Lorentz’s contraction hypothesis was put together just to save the stationary ether. Lorentz’s “local time,” Einstein proposed, was just “time.” And on the matter of space, he divested the ether of its last mechanical quality—its immobility. Between 1910 and 1912 Einstein made clear that, in his view, the principle of the constancy of light together with the principle of relativity rendered the ether supefluous. Initially Einstein’s ideas about space, time and the ether enraged almost all his elder and betters in physics. Soon, however, theoreticians of stature, notably Hermann Minkowski, began to appreciate the possibilities of SR as a theory of space-time. As the 20th century progressed other “categories of understanding” that had been long presumed firm in physics would be challenged as well, starting an anti-necessitarian trend has only gained force ever since. 
Altogether it took 200 years to identify (and then in a fallible, scientific way) credible and not-credible parts in Fresnel’s theories. The identification was diachronic rather than along the way KL&P’s synchronic approach to identification of parts. Diachronic identification generalizes well, and not just over the “physical sciences” ( acommon complaint among critics of realism). Diacronicity looms just as large in many other fields. For example, it has been long maintained that Darwinian hypotheses are simply not susceptible of empirical corroboration the way hypotheses in the physical sciences are, a view that still prevails in some influential circles. But Darwinian hypotheses do generally lead to novel predictions (or adequate analogues like the derivation of fruitful consequences that remained unimagined until after the hypothesis was produced). Consider, for example, the hypothesis introduced in The Origin about the rise of whales. There he relates that he once watched a bear swim for hours with its mouth open, catching insects along the way, as a whale might have done. With that comparison in place, Darwin goes on to suggest that a group of bears may have gradually transformed themselves through random variation and natural selection across numerous generations into animals with increasingly large mouths and structures and habits suitable for life in water, leading to the present whales. At the time few scientists sympathized with this conjecture, which became the subject of such scathing criticism that Darwin removed it from subsequent editions of The Origin. The hypothesis erred at several specific levels, yet—as would become clear more than a century later—its general story was pretty close to the truth. Today no working biologist doubts that all cetaceans descend from four-legged terrestrial mammals. Their confidence rests on many pillars, not least the profusion of intermediate fossils discovered in recent decades. These discoveries were what the Darwinian hypothesis about whales had led one to expect, and in this way they count in favor of them. But the predictive success shown by the latter goes further. With the help of physical methods completely independent of Darwin’s theory and of biology in general, it has been possible to establish the temporal order in which the said adaptations occurred. It unambiguously corresponds to the one predicted by Darwin. The results obtained could have contradicted the Darwinian arrow, but they did not, despite the extreme initial unlikelihood of the findings (except from the vantage point of Darwin’s theoretical proposal itself). It is this initial implausibility the factor that now gives scientific credibility to the idea that Darwin was is approximately correct. And there has been of late much more in favor of it. The linage Darwin proposed for the whales was rich in implications with the character of predictions regarding, for example, molecular and biochemical traits expected in the various evolutionary branches of the cetaceans. These predictions were not available (or even imaginable) in Darwin’s time, as envisioning them required the development and maturation of such disciplines as biochemistry and molecular biology. Still, the key prediction is that, if Darwin was basically correct, then genetically and at the level of biochemical structures and processes present cetacean species will be found to be more closely similar to one another that to other mammals. And so forth. The point is that, as Darwin’s theory played out, a growing number of its posits and narratives have revealed themselves as worthy of justified belief (XXX 2009). 

CONCLUDING REMARKS
The question remains as to how to tell the credible yield of an empirically successful theory from the rest. It took nearly a full century to find out that ether talk was unsound. A few lessons from the case are worth stressing. First, until at least the first decade of the 20th century the ether was well-entrenched in optical discourse, recognized as a posit that was empirically successful and whose existence admitted no reasonable doubt. As a second lesson, then, is that the latter features do not confer absolute warrant for taking anything as approximately true. This might be regarded by some as damaging to realism. If success and freedom from specific doubts are not enough, then when is the “gradual entrenchment” of a theory component sufficient and how much “success” is enough to ensure its probable, approximate truth? Which components in present theories are the ones that we can expect to persist in their successors and/or be judged approximately true from the point of view of future generations of theories? The approach proposed by KL&P at least sought to confer absolute warrant for parts of theories; but, as argued, their approach fails. So, where does this leave the realist project? In the ether case, as in the Darwinian case highlighted in the previous section, what comes to view as robust epistemic yields from successful theories are arrays of thickly textured partial descriptions and narratives that have come to be recognized as beyond reasonable doubt—as beyond doubt as the most compelling talk about “observable” natural objects. In some clearly specifiable respects light is as Fresnel said it was, atoms are as classical physics portrayed them, and whales are as Darwin’s original theory said they were. Elsewhere (XXX) I argue for a diachronic articulation of this kind of theoretical knowledge-gain, a broadly Lakatosian approach to the divide et impera strategy combined with historical induction. 
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^1	  On the history of ether theories there is a growing number of internet sites from reliable educational institutions. See also Stevenson (1972). 
